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The Ideals of Fiction - The Fiction of Ideals 
 
I   The Times 
The prophets of suspicion have done their work. Ours is a time of profound 
skepticism and open cynicism with respect to both the profession and promise of ideals. 
Too often, in the name of some seemingly worthy ideal, we have been led individually 
and collectively into the deepest and most devastating evils. Religious ideals of the 
sanctity of life and universal charity sour into zeal and foster self-righteous exclusion and 
persecution of the non-believer; political ideals of social and economic freedom calcify 
into operational ideologies that justify enslavement and genocide; moral ideals which 
acclaim a healthy community authorize censorship, repression, and bigotry. 
As a result, Idealism, in its quite ordinary sense of aspiring to higher principles 
and concern for others, is argued against by thoughtful people in the interests of rational 
life, citing the historical perils of ideal abstraction. The complaint is that ideals tend to 
empower the mind and spirit to forget or ignore the simple courtesies and concrete 
decencies of civility. It may be a fine point whether, like power, ideals corrupt, or 
whether, again like power in the corrective to Lord Acton, there is only a human tendency 
to its abuse. The result of the intensity of passion, when abusive ideals prevail, is 
sufficiently frightening to give pause. Perhaps no more than pause, however, for whoever 
aspires to a better world must always risk a worse one. Human life and world are both 
framed in the temporal, so there may be no option to the continual reconsideration and 
negotiation of contending ideals. 
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The empowerment of an ideal, of an imaginatively desired possible world, 
inevitably puts the present world at risk; the greater the force of that ideal, the greater the 
risk. This seems a good argument, ceteris paribus, for the primary, prior, and constituting 
ideal of Human Kind, an essential kinship comprising all human beings that places “the 
other” as my kinsperson, as beneficiary of my genuine concern. If the ideals of human 
passions and projects are operational rules of life, inevitable in their occurrence, then we 
require a definition of Human Kind radically different from the exclusive legacy of 
excellence—of agathos and aristos—that traditional philosophy has inherited from 
classical Greek thought. The question then becomes whether arete, virtue (excellence), 
can be universally inclusive of the ordinary. Although the classical Greeks excluded 
slaves and women from the "human community" of the Polis, at least a theoretical 
framework for universal inclusion is met by Aristotle, who wisely provided two different 
characterizations of human-being in his Politics. The first includes that form of life in 
which all members of a community may in principle participate (the vita activa of labor, 
work and action); the second (the vita contemplativa) the higher life of thought, theoria, 
is open only to a select few. The latter form of life distinguishes a category of human kind 
and human possibility not universally shareable. 
Once upon a time and from time to time, human beings have been faulted for a 
lack of ideals—a lack of which meant . . . what? an inability to see beyond one‟s own 
times and interests, a lack of imagination, a failure of any sense of transcendental 
commitment. But there is a persistent and emergent view that, in fact, human beings may 
fare better without ideals. Better to stumble along with intermittent individual conflict 
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and turmoil than suffer the blinding rhetoric of binding ideals that spawns uniform 
convictions stronger than selfishness, and loosens the flood gates of collective terror and 
destruction. For example the scriptural prescription “. . . the righteous are bold as a lion” 
(Proverbs xxvii, 1), has come to mean something very different to the modern ear - not 
that one should be fearless in the profession of one‟s faith, but that one should be fearful 
of the profession of anyone‟s faith. Religious faith, once a vital and common resource 
within a community of believers, now, as a measure of passion and unreason, only 
escalates and aggravates the problem of conflicting ideals. 
 
II   Ideals and Passion 
In discussing ideals in the modern age, we seem caught between the biting 
complaint of Soren Kierkegaard that we live in an age less wicked than wretched, for it 
lacks passion, and W. B. Yeats‟ no less ominous declaration to the contrary that ours is an 
age in which the best lack all conviction while the worst are full of passionate intensity.  
In its simplest expression, an ideal is an idea set in or infused with passion, an idea that 
inspires or provokes passion. In this sense we may wonder whether there is any wisdom 
in it. Is “passionate idea” already an oxymoron? The studied distance of Plato‟s logic in 
The Republic- in the textual convergence of Eidos and Pathos - provides the most 
enduring vision of the fearful interface of Utopia/Dystopia. In Plato‟s ideal state we find 
the passionate engagement of the rational ideal of human order, which carries with it a 
total-authoritarian license to control, censor, and eliminate whatever does not meet with 
the approved ideal. 
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Plato is not alone, nor is he without grace in blurring the distinction between the 
ideal and real. In the “Allegory of the Cave”, he re-presents reality as an arduous 
achievement, a matter of journey and discovery not apparent nor open to the 
undisciplined or uncommitted eye or mind. It is the journey toward this ideal reality that 
determines the ideality and identity of the human kind. From Plato‟s transcendental 
noesis (discovery) to Kant‟s transcendental deduction (construction), the idea has stuck 
with us that reality can only be framed or discerned within, or understood in relation to, 
the ideal. In fact, however, philosophy only mirrors a very ordinary notion independent of 
a theoretical idealism of the sort of Hegel‟s abstract equation of the Rational and the Real. 
Ordinary language itself contains the seeds which grow into theories of human nature, 
into the biased preferment's of one or another category of human kind (as rational animal, 
child of God, naked ape, ungrateful biped . . .) and finally into the politics and policies 
which so often divide us, into the unending wars of the big-enders vs. little-enders. 
So far I have tried to point out that there are problems—conceptual, historical, 
theoretical, and practical—with the notion of the ideal. We are no longer automatically or 
simply attracted to positive associations the word once had in ordinary discourse. 
However, although we may rightly suspect ideals that issue from the mouths of theorist 
and demagogue, there remains a close association in ordinary language and sensibility 
between the ideal and real that we may not want to or have to abandon if we beware the 
undertow of abstraction. 
 
III   Ideals and Literature 
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Fictive literature is limited to an expression and constitution of ideality in the 
sense of establishing an ideal domain, a universe of discourse, an inclusive context of 
imagination. In this role, fiction suspends, brackets, and dissolves the bonds and 
boundaries of the actual and factual, creates a magic circle of intelligible unreality. Fictive 
literature has no part in advocacy or strategy in making an ideal operational. The genius 
of literature is possibility, which defaults when reduced to an instrument of program or 
policy. There is a politics to literature, but only in the incidental if very real sense that in 
its articulation of the possible it may be at cross current to a prevailing practical interest 
in conserving the actual present. Literature and the arts are famously and inherently 
“subversive” in this sense, which Plato rehearsed at great length and censored in short 
order. It is instructive to recall, however, that at the same time, Plato was notoriously 
practicing what he was condemning.  The Republic, as a piece of literature, is a model of 
political subversion of the fourth century Polis through the articulation an opposing ideal. 
In an important sense, literature is simply the idealization of ordinary discourse. 
This is different from the philosophical claim that (ordinary) language is already an 
idealization (symbolization) of the phenomena common to experience. The discourse of 
fictive literature is only that, of course: discourse—writing and reading. It is composed of 
nothing but words and ideas and sustained by nothing but imagination. Words, literary or 
otherwise, are not just so many things lying about, stacked end to end; rather, words come 
in contextual clumps and dramatic clusters, have a narrative character and continuity 
intended and appropriated in literary contexts in a special and intelligible way. They 
constitute, encumber, and people a world of ideas—an ideal world, one removed from the 
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busy bother, the intrusive distractions, greasy commonplaces, and laboring obligations of 
the work-a-day world. 
Fictive literature in this way makes (poiesis) an ideal world, a sharable world of 
ideas in the original sense of creating and recreating, describing and re-describing “human 
kind”—possible shared meanings of “human” not subject to the current press of the 
factical or the crush of necessity. The fiction of story, narrative activity itself, is arguably 
the making and remaking of human kind. The human being, as Homo Faber, is a maker 
of a communal world through labor and work, as Homo Sapiens he is a knower of things, 
as Homo Ludens a player of games. But informing and integrating all these conceptions is 
the Greek insistence on the fundamental nature of the human being as an animal with 
speech, and by extension, a story-telling animal, a meaning-creating animal not limited to 
the immediate and referential. The first and perhaps sustaining task of literature is to 
constitute a domain of the human, not limited to the ideologies of a particular place, 
regime, language, or time. In literary contexts a story yokes together an intelligible cargo 
of thoughts, feelings, moods and actions into a time, a place, a life. There may be 
something primal in language itself which proclaims the human tendency to connect, 
compare, organize, unify—a propensity parallel to mind. For example, persons typically 
respond in the absence of direction to a list of arbitrary words by weaving them into a 
picture or meaning, just as in an interpretation of a Rorschach image, Gestalt field, or 
journal cartoon. This may be put in plain or provocative ways: that language is 
fundamentally metaphorical (Heidegger), a mobile army of metaphors, such that there are 
no facts only interpretations (Nietzsche), that every telling has a taling (Joyce), or that 
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Man is a story-telling animal (MacIntyre). The fact is that fiction is pervasive, that the 
ideal of human-kind is a convergence of full spectrum—of the real and imagined, the 
actual and the possible, the remembered and revealed. Fiction forms an unreal world of 
residual tensions between „to be/was/and is‟; it informs the disjoints between „as if/should 
be/and might have been‟. The fictive is ideal in the surface sense that it is not factive; it 
constitutes an ideal world in the deeper sense that it both expresses and invites a 
community of meaning, of understanding completed by the reader or audience out of the 
common resource of shared language and value. 
 
IV   Ideals in Literature  
So far we have argued a simple point about the idealizing process of fiction: it has 
the special positive character and facility of generating spiritual possibilities and 
preserving cultural alternatives.  But the fictive ideal brings equally the danger of 
confusing appearance and reality, mixing fantasy with fact, of romanticizing the violent 
and sentimentalizing the fantastic, of loosening or of losing sense for the consequences of 
abstraction. We must keep both this promise and problem in mind as we turn to the ideals 
of humankind, in literature. Where do we begin and how do we track and evaluate the 
polymorphous expressions which collectively constitute human consciousness, the labor, 
love, laughter and language—the residuals with which we write the history of 
civilization? 
One might first try to ground the ideal of “human kind” in terms of a factual or 
empirical core, for example, does the concept of "human species" constitute a fact? If so, 
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it is a fact limited to comparative biological placement, phylogenetic scaling of theory. 
Even so committed a materialist as Marx argues that human species life is not a fact, only 
a projected possibility, what independently of Marx‟s language we could reasonably call 
an ideal. Whatever kinship limits may be set by biological determinants, nothing 
guarantees either human life or human world, the time and place within which a person 
can realize the potential (power, possibility) which is the meaning of her life. 
If one understands fiction as possibility, as the expression of what is not yet and 
not now, but of what is possible (the ideal), then this ideational activity of story telling, of 
fictive literature, becomes a defining activity, a characteristic way of human-being. What 
may be more important than any particular ideal expressed within literature is the ideal 
fact of fiction itself.  Two obvious and traditional ways of setting out the boundaries of 
human kind in intellectual history are in terms of human nature, and the human project: 
strategies of essential presupposition, and genealogical development. Both operate 
through the production of ideal types of persons, and of communities.  Literature is an 
ideal presentation, as well as a representation of the ideal in the sense that it creates 
possible worlds. This basic sense of ideal functions to constitute a coherent realm of 
ideas; it frames a world in which perception is engaged by the perspective of imagination. 
In a second and related sense of ideal, literature presents and represents 
possibilities open to and worthy of aspiration, or, on the other hand, deserving 
condemnation. This sense of ideal, of passion and risk, expresses the pathos of human 
struggle and ascendance. These shaping forces of ideals are connected in a way that 
makes literature a generative ground of cultural change. 
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V   The Work of Fiction 
The work which fiction does—both as process and product—frames an ideality of 
distance, bracketing immediate consequence through appeal to the fantasy of deeper 
consciousness, probing human purpose and possibility. The process has been articulated 
and analyzed in depth and detail in our time by, among others, Heidegger, Ricoeur, 
Derrida, Foucault, Barthes, and Kristeva, and all with predictably great differences among 
them. The products of literature are vastly variable, depending on election and selection. 
Given any literary period or theme, one may chose from an incredible range of works to 
exemplify what is to be found embodied there—valuational ideals which match the time 
or temper of a particular reading interest or writing task. 
Various historical forms of presentation of ideals have come to have the 
“classical” character of “immortality”. The Greek concept of nobility of action—of great 
words and deeds—is an example of the ideal of harmonic community: of moderation and 
the free pursuit of excellence.  This remains a fictional foundation-stone of western 
culture even though few actively aspire now to any such thing. Greek ideals, from the 
rustic almanac of Hesiod through the urban sophistication of Aristophanes are imprinted 
and embodied in the literature of philosophy, history, drama, poetry, and epic, as indelibly 
as they are in the legal legend of Solon, and the politics of Periklean Athens. While we no 
longer live within or aspire to attain either an heroic or tragic culture, the language of 
Homer and Sophocles still resonates with the tenor of human kind—one we can 
recognize and acknowledge without intention to realize. 
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While classical heroic literature with its continuing if fantastic cult of the hero 
seems timeless, other periods and their expressions of ideals have less hold on either 
imagination or aspiration. Ideals in one frame of time may appear absurd in another, and 
the literature of that time no less so. The Book of the Courtier is perhaps one such 
example. Although the literary cult of the classical hero may be antithetical to the ironic 
temperament of contemporary culture, we are still drawn to that literature for models of 
courage, endurance, love and despair, albeit more transformed into psychological 
categories than heroic activity. 
Even though a mythology of first things—stories of the emergence of time and 
world—are no longer even peripheral to our daily lives, we still find meaning in the 
narratives of Hesiod and Homer. We do not live in an age of warriors, but find Achilles 
and Hector speaking to what is fine and fearful in us still. We do not live in an age of 
Kings, but Shakespeare‟s language of Henry V, of Hamlet and Lear, of Macbeth and 
Richard II, expresses still the stuff of our deepest thoughts, our most intimate fears, 
hopes, and regrets. Medieval monastic acts of faith in producing the Books of Hours, long 
laboring works of love in response to a sense of divinity no longer ours, Renaissance 
optimism in the capacities of the human spirit, Romantic passion generated in response to 
the beauty of nature, Victorian sensibility and morality—have all gone the way of 
antediluvian tides and antebellum winds, but all are recoverable in the ideality of 
literature, possibilities brought to life in the context of our reading. 
 
VI   The Ideals of Fiction; The Fiction of Ideals 
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Some ideals, then, are written on the wind, dissolve in the ebb and flow of time 
and change. Others appear to be foundational.  We have argued that a primary grounding 
ideal in literature is or ought to be a universal idea of human-kind. But in what sense can 
fiction be a ground of anything, and what decides the priority of one fictional ideal or age 
over another? Fiction grounds in the sense that stories share.  Ideals are essential fictions, 
fictions we believe to be essential.  The fictions which are crucial for human life and 
growth are minimally of two sorts: those which provide boundaries to our ordinary sense 
of the human—what we share with all others—and those which provide inspiration to 
overcome the boundaries of the merely human, the extraordinary sense of the human 
which marks the genius of human kind. Ideally, and in its ideality, literature must find a 
way both to ground and aspire—to provide boundaries for human decency and to 
transcend boundaries of convention toward creative human development. 
The world‟s great literature has recently been under attack as a restrictive Canon 
of Euroculture male dominion.  But whatever its preferential limits, that literature has 
succeeded admirably in its institutional ideality to generate and sustain a framework of 
imaginative transcendence: to set out the domain both of necessity and possibility of 
human culture and understanding. 
One of the presumptive ideals of the canon of world literature currently in 
question is its articulation and preservation of a living tradition of shared values. Critics 
rightly point out that this tradition has privileged male gender and shorted contributions 
of non-European artists. Exemplary of this at the very arche of classical resources is the 
Greek literature of the Polei, which as a matter of course excluded women, slaves and 
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foreigners. It is instructive, however, that we do not dismiss this literature for these faults, 
or do so at our cultural peril. Simply too much of what is crucial for very conception of 
the ideal of human kind is spiritually generated here. What we must argue for, instead, is 
a continual re-evaluation and interpretation of world literature past and present. 
Aristotle‟s expressed ideals do not otherwise square with his regrettable discounting of 
women, for example, depicting social fact as a natural condition.  His argument defending 
the practice of slavery is transparently an accommodation to the convenient economy of 
his time. His bogus idea of “natural slave” is in fact contradicted and discredited by his 
act of freeing his own slaves in his last will. The blunders of such bias do not discredit the 
rest of his work on moral and political ideals of justice, nor does such exclusion 
automatically dismiss the literature of any historical period.  We should perhaps abandon 
reverence to a particular canon of literature, but we should not displace the tradition or 
substance of its literature. 
There is a sense in which literature, ideally, would constitute a tradition without 
institution. Put another way, the healthy ideality of literature may be undermined by 
institutionalization. Literature must remain open on pain of the same kind of objection we 
made earlier to ideals of policy which become exclusive and intolerant. Works of 
literature that are genuine and authentic acknowledge and open horizons of understanding 
of human kind.  In so doing, they become a definitive activity, an ideal expression of 
what collectively we have been, and of what we may yet become. 
